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AEDPA DEFERENCE AND THE UNDEVELOPED STATE
FACTUAL RECORD: MONROE V. ANGELONE AND NEW
EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
In 1992, Beverly Anne Monroe was convicted in a Virginia state
court of murdering her boyfriend.' She exhausted the appeals
process in the Virginia court system and filed a petition for habeas
corpus with the Virginia Supreme Court.2 Her most compelling
claim alleged prosecutorial suppression of evidence.3 Among other
allegations, she accused the prosecution of failing to disclose that its
chief witness was a career informant who received a sentence
reduction in exchange for her testimony.4 The Virginia Supreme
Court denied Monroe's petition, summarily ruling that those claims
that had not been procedurally defaulted were without merit.5 The
court also summarily denied Monroe's motion for additional
discovery, through which she might have uncovered more evidence
and further developed her claim.6
Petitioner then filed for habeas relief in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, again claiming prosecute-
1. Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 2003).
2. See id. at 293.
3. See id. at 290. In federal district court, Monroe also alleged ineffective assistance of
trial counsel and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against her. She based her
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on trial counsel's failure to challenge the voluntariness
of her statements to a detective during the investigation of the murder. See Monroe v.
Angelone, No. 3:98CV254, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26310, at *86-89 (E.D. Va. Mar. 28, 2002).
She eventually dropped the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Following the disposition
of her habeas claim in federal district court, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
declined to hear the sufficiency of the evidence claim, finding "the district court's resolution
of this claim is not 'debatable amongst jurists of reason." Monroe, 323 F.3d at 290 n.2.
4. See Monroe, 323 F.3d at 293, 298, 301.
5. See id. at 294.
6. See id.
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rial suppression of evidence.7 The district court reviewed her claims
in accordance with the precepts of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).8 AEDPA mandates that federal
courts reviewing state court dispositions of habeas petitions
"adjudicated ... on the merits"-those decided on substantive rather
than procedural grounds-must defer to those dispositions unless
the state court's decision is "contrary to, or involve [s] an unreason-
able application of, clearly established" Supreme Court precedent. 10
Petitioner was able to show good cause that she would be entitled
to relief were she able to develop fully the factual basis for her
claim, and therefore, the federal court granted petitioner's motion
for additional discovery." During federal discovery, petitioner
uncovered a "wealth of exculpatory evidence that the prosecution
7. See id. at 290. This Note refers to prosecutorial suppression of evidence claims as
"Brady claims," named after Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court
precedent that established the framework for the claim. The prosecution commits a Brady
violation when it suppresses 'evidence favorable to an accused upon request ... where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution." Id. at 87. Also, this Note refers to ineffective assistance of counsel claims
as "Strickland claims." In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court
developed its two-part ineffective assistance of counsel test, requiring a petitioner to prove
that counsel performed "below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that counsel's
performance prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687-88.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. II 1996).
9. See Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 946-47 (5th Cir. 2001).
10. Id. at 946 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Procedurally defaulted claims are largely
beyond the scope of this Note; however, they are always a concern for petitioners. In Monroe's
case, the Virginia Supreme Court held, and throughout the federal habeas proceeding the
Commonwealth argued, that Monroe had defaulted her Brady claim because she had not
raised it at the earliest point in the proceedings in accordance with Slayton v. Parrigan, 205
S.E.2d 680, 682 (Va. 1974). See Monroe, 323 F.3d at 294. During the state proceedings,
petitioner uncovered some exculpatory materials through a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request. See id. The federal district court excluded some of these exculpatory materials
from its consideration, because it found that petitioner could have used the FOIA process to
obtain those particular items earlier in the proceedings. See id. at 294-95 n.8. Ultimately, as
to petitioner's Brady claim in totality, the Fourth Circuit did not rule on the "procedural
default issue," because the evidence the district court considered was 'sufficient to warrant
its award of habeas corpus relief." Id. at 290-91.
11. See Monroe, 323 F.3d at 295. The Supreme Court interpreted Habeas Corpus Rule 6
on discovery in Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997). The Court stated, "[Wihere specific
allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are
fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is ... entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court
to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry.' Id. at 908-09
(quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)).
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had suppressed." 2 The district court and, on appeal, the Fourth
Circuit reviewed all "new evidence" discovered in the federal
proceeding independently and the Brady claim itself de novo,
reasoning that if the state court had never considered the new
evidence, there was no way to apply AEDPA deference to findings
regarding such evidence.13 The Fourth Circuit then proceeded to
review the entire record cumulatively, affording a presumption of
correctness only to those evidentiary items on which the state court
had made explicit findings. 4 It affirmed the district court's grant of
habeas relief primarily on the strength of the "new evidence" on
which deference did not operate.
5
The Fourth Circuit's decision to review the evidence independ-
ently and the claim in totality de novo seems unassailable. Logi-
cally, a state court cannot rule on a claim when the facts supporting
it did not surface until the federal proceeding.'" However, the
federal courts have not uniformly applied the same principle in
similar circumstances: when evidence is available to a state court
but the state court does not actually consider that evidence during
its proceedings-for example, if the state court rules on a peti-
tioner's claim without granting her an evidentiary hearing to
develop the factual basis of her claim,'7 or if the state court loses
evidence during habeas proceedings and rules without considering
that evidence.'" In such circumstances, federal circuits are split as
12. Monroe, 323 F.3d at 290. Exculpatory evidence "must be favorable to the accused." Id.
at 299.
13. See id. at 298-300. The district court claimed to employ a more deferential standard
of review, which it certainly applied to petitioner's Strickland and sufficiency of the evidence
claims; however, after citing the deferential standard, the text of the opinion says little about
deference to the state court's determination of the Brady claim. See id. For further discussion
of the district court's standard of review, see infra note 133.
14. See id. at 298-99.
15. See id. at 300.
16. See id. at 298-99.
17. See Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir. 2003) (upholding the federal
district court's decision to grant an evidentiary hearing because the state court denied
petitioner relief on the merits without an evidentiary hearing, and reviewing the prisoner's
claim de novo despite the deference mandated by AEDPA).
18. See Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 944 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the federal
district court had correctly granted an evidentiary hearing, but applying a deferential review
despite the fact that the state court lost exhibits admitted into evidence and did not consider
the exhibits when deciding petitioner's case).
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to whether to apply AEDPA deference to any state court decision
made on the merits of the claim.
This Note argues that courts should treat all material evidence
not considered by the state courts as "new evidence"-whether it
surfaces during state or federal proceedings-and that courts should
review the claim as supported by the new evidence de novo, as the
Fourth Circuit did in Monroe. 9 Part I of this Note briefly discusses
AEDPA and the manner in which this legislation has changed
federal habeas review.2° This Part also examines recent Supreme
Court precedent regarding the application of AEDPA standards in
federal court and argues that despite these opinions, uncertainty
persists as to how federal courts must apply deference. Part II
argues that this uncertainty manifests itself most obviously in cases
like Monroe, in which a petitioner is unable to develop fully the
factual basis for her claim in state court. It discusses the stark split
between the Fifth and Tenth Circuits regarding evidentiary
hearings and the application of deference in this area.2' Like a grant
of federal discovery, an evidentiary hearing at the federal level
allows a petitioner to develop fully the factual basis for her claim;
however, some courts effectively ignore the full factual record as
developed pursuant to an evidentiary hearing and continue to defer
to the undeveloped state record.22 Finally, Part III discusses the
need for a uniform standard of review regarding undeveloped
factual records that are completed during a federal proceeding.
Fundamental fairness and judicial efficiency support the idea that
evidence available to, but not actually considered by, state courts
should be treated in the same manner as evidence revealed for the
first time in federal court, without deference to the state court.
Consequently, this Note argues that federal courts should review all
such evidence independently to determine whether it is material to
the claim, and if the court finds the evidence material, it should
then review the claim de novo.
19. See Monroe, 323 F.3d at 298.
20. While numerous federal judges and legal scholars have already commented on the
1996 changes to the federal habeas corpus process, this Note will likewise highlight these
changes to develop the context for this Note's argument.
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (Supp. II 1996) (governing evidentiary hearings).
22. See Valdez, 274 F.3d at 941.
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I. AEDPA AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
This Part briefly discusses pre- and post-AEDPA habeas review
at the federal level. It then analyzes Williams v. Taylor,23 the
seminal Supreme Court case interpreting the § 2254(d)(1) standard
of review, and a more recent decision, Lockyer v. Andrade,24 neither
of which has served to crystallize the process by which a federal
court should apply AEDPA deference.
A. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Before and After 1996
Prior to 1996, the main restriction on a federal court's review of
a state court's disposition of a habeas petition was that the federal
court had to afford a presumption of correctness to state court
findings of fact.2' At first, the Supreme Court tempered that
requirement by allowing a federal court "to receive evidence and try
the facts anew" if a petitioner could prove she was entitled to
relief.26 However, federal courts began to lose their comprehensive
powers of review in the 1970s when the Supreme Court ordered
them to abide by decisions made in accordance with state proce-
dural rules.2 7 With the passage of AEDPA in 1996, Congress
further restricted independent federal review of a state court's
legal conclusions.2" Through AEDPA, Congress confined de novo
review of mixed questions of law and fact to situations in which a.
petitioner could prove the state court had made a decision based on
an "unreasonable application of' or a determination "contrary to"
23. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). For clarity, this case will subsequently be referred to as Terry
Williams.
24. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994) (revised and redesignated subsection (e) in 1996).
26. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963).
27. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (holding that a prisoner who failed
to challenge his confession at trial could not raise the point for the first time in federal habeas
court); see also Christopher Flood, Closing the Circle: Case v. Nebraska and the Future of
Habeas Reform, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 633, 646-47 (2001-2002) (tracing the
increased deference given to state procedural rules from the 1970s onward).
28. Justice Stevens noted that Congress enacted these changes "to curb delays, to prevent
'retrials' on federal habeas, and to give effect to state convictions to the extent possible under
law." Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 386 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
189120051
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Supreme Court precedent, or based on an "unreasonable determina-
tion of the facts."29
Before the Supreme Court interpreted the 1996 amendments,
some federal courts persisted in reviewing the disposition of habeas
petitions by state courts in much the same fashion as they had pre-
AEDPA, because the new statute prescribed an unfamiliar standard
of review they found difficult to apply.s While Supreme Court
precedent now clearly limits federal review of state dispositions of
fully developed habeas claims,"' confusion persists as to the manner
in which deference operates on undeveloped factual records.32
B. Terry Williams v. Taylor: Defining § 2254(d)(1)'s Prongs of
Deference
Congress's desire to curb the federal habeas review process and
to give force to state court decisions resulted in avoidance of the
familiar "clearly erroneous" standard for appellate review in §
2254(d)(1). 33 Congress instead crafted a new standard: A federal
court can grant a writ only when it finds the state court's disposition
of a habeas petition is "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application
of" Supreme Court precedent. 4 Because this standard was unfamil-
iar to federal court judges, the federal courts did not apply it
uniformly. For instance, the Seventh Circuit read the statute as
restricting the breadth of precedent on which a federal court could
rely when assessing a state court's disposition of a habeas claim to
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. 111996). In Terry Williams, Justice Stevens, dissenting
in part, noted that questions of pure law and questions of mixed law and fact are difficult to
distinguish, as "[mlost ... questions that arise in habeas corpus proceedings-and therefore
most 'decisions' to be made-require the federal judge to apply a rule of law to a set of facts,
some of which may be disputed and some undisputed." Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 384
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part). This Note is primarily concerned with Brady and Strickland
claims, which courts have widely considered to be mixed questions of law and fact. See id. at
405-06; Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1215-16 (10th Cir. 2003).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 33-37.
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. See infra Part II.
33. See 28 U.S.C. 8 (2254(d) (1994) (revised and redesigned subsection (e) in 1996).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. II 1996). Once a federal court determines that a state
court's disposition of a petition runs afoul of either of the prongs, it no longer has to apply
deference to the state court's legal conclusions. See id.
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Supreme Court precedent only, not a circuit's own precedent. 35 The
court interpreted the statute as leaving intact a federal court's
independent power of review over questions of federal law.36 In
contrast, the Fourth Circuit held that the statute curtailed a federal
court's independent power of review and allowed a federal court to
grant a writ only when the state court applied "relevant precedent
in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreason-
able."37
In Terry Williams, the Supreme Court finally interpreted §
2254(d)(1)'s two prongs and overturned a Fourth Circuit decision
requiring deference to the state habeas court's dismissal of peti-
tioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.3" Though this opinion
served to alleviate some of the discrepancies among the circuits, it
was unusual in that Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority in
defining the standard of review, while Justice Stevens authored the
section applying the standard to the facts of the case and applied a
somewhat different standard to find that the Virginia Supreme
Court had erroneously decided the case.3 9
Justice O'Connor explained the standard of review first by
providing examples of decisions contrary to federal law and
unreasonable applications of federal law, and then by construing
specific words in the statute.4 ° She stated that a state court makes
a decision contrary to Supreme Court precedent if it "arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of
law" or reaches a different outcome when faced with a set of facts
identical to those the Supreme Court has faced.4' If a state court
unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent, it means it has
"identifie[d] the correct governing legal rule from this Court's cases
but unreasonably applie[d] it to the facts of the particular state
prisoner's case."42 Justice O'Connor next stated that federal courts
35. See Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996).
36. See id.
37. Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998).
38. 529 U.S. 362,402-13 (2000).
39. See id. at 390-98, 402-13.
40. See id. at 405-13.
41. Id. at 405.
42. Id. at 407. A state court can also unreasonably extend Supreme Court precedent to a
new area of law, see id., but that portion of the analysis is beyond the scope of this Note.
18932005]
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must examine unreasonableness objectively.43 She admitted that
"[tihe term 'unreasonable' is no doubt difficult to define.... [but] [flor
purposes of today's opinion, the most important point is that an
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect
application of federal law."" Furthermore, the Court held that a
federal court should not employ more familiar standards such as
"erroneous" or "incorrect" to determine in its "independent judg-
ment" that the state court "applied ... federal law erroneously or
incorrectly."
45
Though the majority's interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) certainly
circumscribed the type of review the Seventh Circuit had
endorsed,46 its explanation of unreasonable applications of federal
law and decisions made contrary to federal law read less as
affirmative guidance and more as a list of prohibitions.47 Making the
standard more confusing, Justice Stevens, whose interpretation of
§ 2254(d)(1) differed from Justice O'Connor's, wrote for the majority
in applying the standard to the context of Williams' case. 4 He found
the Virginia Supreme Court had applied the clearly established
Supreme Court precedent announced in Strickland v. Washington
in both a "contrary" and "unreasonable" manner.49 He determined
that the court had unreasonably applied the precedent first by
"requir[ing] a separate inquiry into fundamental fairness," which
the precedent did not mandate.5 ° Second, the court had been
unreasonable in determining that petitioner was not prejudiced by
trial counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating
evidence during petitioner's sentencing phase, because it had not
"evaluate[d] the totality of the available mitigation evidence ... in
reweighing it against the evidence in aggravation."51 Likewise, in
her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor found unreasonable
and contrary applications of Strickland v. Washington.52 She, too,
43. Id. at 410.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 411.
46. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
47. Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10.
48. Id. at 392-98.
49. Id. at 399.
50. Id. at 393-95.
51. Id. at 397-98.
52. Id. at 413-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
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examined each piece of evidence to determine that "[tihe Virginia
Supreme Court's decision reveals an obvious failure to consider the
totality of the omitted mitigation evidence.""3 The Justices did not
explain what made their two opinions "objective" reviews of"unrea-
sonableness," rather than applications of their own "independent
judgment."' 4 In other words, no single methodology was apparent,
and the Justices did not attempt to reconcile their differing
interpretations of § 2254(d)(1) with their similar applications of its
mandates to the facts of Williams' case.
In conclusion, other than prohibiting an independent review and
providing examples of "contrary" and "unreasonable applications"
of Supreme Court precedent, Terry Williams offers little in the way
of a methodology for federal courts to use in assessing state court
dismissals of habeas petitions. This is particularly true in the sense
that Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, recited one standard
of review and Justice Stevens, writing for another majority, perhaps
applied another standard in reaching his decision to reverse the
Fourth Circuit.
C. Lockyer v. Andrade: Recent Precedent Adds a Further
Prohibition to a Federal Court's Determination of'Contrary"
and "Unreasonable"
The fact that the Terry Williams standard of review is difficult for
federal courts to apply consistently is clear even in subsequent
Supreme Court decisions. In Lockyer v. Andrade," the Court
reviewed whether the California Court of Appeal's disposition of a
habeas petition was an unreasonable interpretation of Supreme
Court precedent regarding excessive prison sentences.56 In contrast
with the Terry Williams Court, the Lockyer majority and dissent
recited the same standard of review57 but came up with very
different conclusions when they applied that standard to Andrade's
case.5" Although unanimity is rare in any court, the striking aspect
53. Id. at 416 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
54. Id. at 411.
55. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
56. Id. at 66.
57. See id. at 72, 77.
58. See id. at 77, 83.
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of this case was the disparity among the Justices' opinions, despite
the fact that they were interpreting their own "clearly established"
precedent. 9
In Lockyer, petitioner received a fifty-year sentence under
California's three strikes law for three crimes he alleged amounted
only to "stealing approximately $150 in videotapes."" He petitioned
for habeas relief on the grounds that such a sentence was excessive
and grossly disproportionate to the crimes he committed, in
violation of the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.6 The Ninth Circuit granted petitioner relief by
interpreting the § 2254(d)(1) provision of "unreasonable application"
of federal law as allowing a federal court to conduct an "independent
review of the legal question ... [prior to applying deference to
determine if] clear error occurred" at the state level.62
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor rejected the Ninth
Circuit's methodology, stating: "We disagree with this approach.
AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any one
methodology in deciding the only question that matters under
§ 2254(d)(1)-whether a state court decision is contrary to, or
59. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. II 1996). Another example of conflicting interpretations
of precedent occurred in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), an ineffective assistance of
counsel case. The majority relied in part on Terry Williams as 'clearly established" precedent,
requiring that trial counsel conduct a reasonable investigation into the background of a
defendant in a capital case before making a "tactical decision" not to present mitigating
evidence of the defendant's background. See id. at 522-23. In finding that the state court
unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, the Court conducted a thorough analysis of
trial counsel's decisions and meticulously reviewed portions of the transcript from state court
proceedings. See id. at 523-29.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Scalia first accused the majority of relying on precedent that
was not even decided at the time the state court ruled on Wiggins' claim and that therefore
was not "clearly established." Id. at 542-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that even the
majority recognized Terry Williams was merely before the court on habeas review at the time
of the state court's decision). Second, he argued that even if Terry Williams could be
considered precedent, the majority had 'seti at naught the statutory scheme we once
described as... 'highly deferential by ignoring the state court's factual findings without "clear
and convincing evidence" rebutting their accuracy. Id. at 538. The Wiggins decision illustrates
how unsettled the § 2254(d)(1) analysis remains.
60. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70.
61. Id. The prosecution elected to treat these crimes as felonies rather than
misdemeanors, and the jury determined that the defendant's three counts of first-degree
residential burglary constituted three violent felonies as required by the three strikes law. Id.
at 67-68.
62. Id. at 69.
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involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law."63 Then, in reversing the Ninth Circuit's finding of unreason-
ableness, Justice O'Connor reviewed the "clearly established"
precedent in the excessive sentencing area and noted that it was
"not ... a model of clarity."' Despite the murkiness, she found that
a contrary or unreasonable application of this precedent would occur
only under the "gross disproportionality principle, the precise
contours of which are unclear, applicable only in the 'exceedingly
rare' and 'extreme' case."65 The majority held that the California
Court of Appeal's decision was not a contrary decision, because it
relied on correct precedent and because the court faced a set of facts
distinguishable from those in the original cases.66 Furthermore, the
decision was not unreasonable, primarily because precedent provide
legislatures with "broad discretion to fashion a sentence," giving the
state courts considerable leeway to review the "contours" of the
sentence.67 In sum, the majority simply did not see this case as
exceptional enough to qualify as a constitutional violation under the
gross disproportionality principle.68
In contrast, Justice Souter, employing the same standard of
review, found both contrary and unreasonable applications of
Supreme Court precedent.69 First, he declared that the facts of
Andrade's case were sufficiently similar to clearly established
Supreme Court precedent finding gross disproportionality.7 °
Therefore, the fact that the California Court of Appeal reached the
opposite result in Lockyer meant the decision was contrary to clearly
63. Id. at 71.
64. Id. at 71-72.
65. Id. at 73 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
66. See id. at 73-74.
67. Id. at 76.
68. See id. at 77.
69. Id. at 78 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at 78-79 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter compared this case with Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), in which a nonviolent offender received a life sentence without
parole under South Dakota's recidivist statute after committing seven nonviolent crimes, the
last of which was issuing a $100 "no account" check, which carried a maximum punishment
of five years in prison and a $5,000 fine. Id. at 279-81. The Solem Court granted the writ,
finding that the punishment exceeded the gravity of the crime and was disproportionate to
sentences served by similar offenders in the same jurisdiction and other jurisdictions. Id. at
303.
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established precedent." Second, Justice Souter reviewed gross
proportionality in light of the California legislature's purpose in
passing the three strikes law. 2 The law "responds to a condition of
the defendant shown by his prior felony record, his danger to
society, and it reflects a judgment that 25 years of incapacitation
prior to parole eligibility is appropriate when a defendant exhibiting
such a condition commits another felony." 3 Justice Souter's concern
with the state court's application of the sentence in Lockyer's case
was that Lockyer committed two minor felonies in quick succession
and did not become substantially more dangerous between the two
crimes as to warrant a doubling of his sentence.74 Justice Souter
claimed that the application of the three strikes law to trivial crimes
constituted an "irrational" and therefore "unreasonable" application
of Supreme Court precedent.75
In a similar fashion to the Terry Williams Court, the Lockyer
Court clearly articulated only the standard of review it was not
using.7v The majority accused the Ninth Circuit of employing the
wrong standard of review and then focused on the murkiness of
Supreme Court precedent in the area of gross proportionality. It
concluded that the lack of clarity gave state courts leeway to fashion
sentences and that violations of the principle would be extremely
rare.7 In contrast, the dissent, also using the "objectively unreason-
able" standard, never chastised the appellate court's liberal
methodology but instead found unreasonable both the state court's
contrary decision in a fact scenario similar to the clearly established
Supreme Court precedent, and the state court's application of the
three strikes law to trivial crimes that did not meet the California
legislature's purpose for passing the law.78
With Justices O'Connor and Stevens espousing different stan-
dards of review but the same outcome in Terry Williams, and
Justices O'Connor and Souter employing the same standard of
71. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 78-79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 80-81.
73. Id. at 81.
74. Id. at 81-82.
75. Id. at 82.
76. See id. at 75.
77. See id. at 73, 76.
78. See id. at 80-82.
1898 [Vol. 46:1887
MONROE V. ANGELONE AND NEW EVIDENCE
review but coming to very different conclusions in Lockyer, it is no
wonder that applying deference consistently continues to be a
confusing task for federal courts reviewing state court dispositions
of habeas petitions. The next Part of this Note examines this
confusion in the context of habeas claims that petitioners are unable
to develop fully during the state court proceedings.
II. DIFFERENCES AMONG THE CIRCUITS IN CASES WITH
UNDEVELOPED FACTUAL RECORDS
Taken together, Terry Williams and Lockyer place restrictions on
a federal court's review of a state court's dismissal of a habeas
petition but do not offer a clear methodology for reviewing such
dismissals, particularly with regard to determining whether a state
court decision was "objectively unreasonable." The decisions indicate
that the Supreme Court condones a variety of approaches in
applying § 2254(d)(1). This Part argues that while variety might
well be defensible when a state court's dismissal of a habeas petition
is thorough in its analysis of facts and legal conclusions, the same
cannot be said for dismissals of undeveloped factual claims on the
basis of incomplete legal analysis. In making this argument, this
Part discusses methods by which federal courts remedy undeveloped
factual records and the approaches they take when applying AEDPA
deference pursuant to these remedial procedures.
One way a federal court can remedy an incomplete factual record
is by holding a federal evidentiary hearing.79 AEDPA limits federal
evidentiary hearings to situations in which, inter alia, the claim
relies on a "factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.""0 In its decision in
Williams v. Taylor,"' the Supreme Court spoke decisively in holding
that a federal evidentiary hearing is warranted whenever a
petitioner is diligent but unsuccessful in developing the factual
basis for his claim in state court.8 2 Writing for a unanimous Court,
79. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (Supp. II 1996).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1996).
81. 529 U.S. 420 (2000). For clarity, this case will subsequently be referred to as Michael
Williams.
82. Id. at 430, 437.
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Justice Kennedy emphasized that the petitioner's "reasonable
attempt" to develop the claims and his lack of fault in failing to do
so were crucial to the decision.' Whether the petitioner "could have
... discovered" the facts during the state court proceedings was not
important, as the only relevant inquiry was whether he was
"diligent in his efforts" to uncover evidence. 4
Despite the fact that Michael Williams makes clear the standard
for granting an evidentiary hearing, no such precedent exists to
instruct federal courts on whether and how AEDPA deference
applies to evidence developed in those hearings. The Fifth and
Tenth Circuits take opposing positions on this question. The Fifth
Circuit has held that even in cases in which a district court correctly
grants an evidentiary hearing to remedy an incomplete record, it
still must afford AEDPA deference to the state court's "adjudication
on the merits."85 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit has held that the
lack of a full and fair hearing during the state proceeding lifts the
bar of deference."
A related line of cases with undeveloped state court factual
records, including Monroe v. Angelone, 7 involves "new evidence"
uncovered for the first time in federal discovery or through a
petitioner's FOIA request." Generally, the "new evidence" is Brady
evidence. 9 Several federal courts of appeals have reviewed such
claims de novo, reasoning that because the factual underpinnings
of the claim were either nonexistent or very primitive during the
state court proceedings, deferring to the state court decision is
generally infeasible.' Others, however, have been much more
deferential to the state court's disposition. This Part focuses on the
reasoning in opinions from the Fifth, Tenth, and Fourth Circuits
83. See id. at 435.
84. Id.
85. See Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 950 (5th Cir. 2001). Again, an "adjudication on
the merits" occurs whenever a state court rules substantively. Adjudication on the merits
"does not speak to the quality of the process," and the disposition of the claim can be as terse
as one word. Id.
86. See Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1215-16 (10th Cir. 2003).
87. 323 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2003).
88. For a discussion of the standard of review for federal discovery, see supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
89. For a definition of Brady evidence, see supra note 7.
90. For a discussion of the other circuits that employ this standard, see infra note 133.
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and concludes that, depending on the type of claim and the circuit
in which the petitioner brings the claim, she is likely to experience
a strikingly different result.
A. The Fifth Circuit's Lack of a Requirement of a Full and Fair
Hearing for Deference to Operate
Like the petitioner in Terry Williams, the petitioner in Valdez v.
Cockrell9 alleged his trial counsel were ineffective by failing to
present mitigating evidence regarding his background, evidence
that he alleged would have spared him the death penalty.92 The
state habeas court afforded petitioner an evidentiary hearing and
made historical findings of fact as to certain pieces of evidence;93
however, that court lost a number of exhibits, including the trial
transcript.94 Excluding the missing evidence from its consideration,
the court dismissed the petition. 5 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas granted petitioner an evidentiary
hearing, finding that the state court's error, rather than petitioner's
lack of diligence, prevented petitioner from developing fully the
factual basis for his claim. 6 Though the Fifth Circuit concurred that
the granting of the evidentiary hearing was appropriate under
91. 274 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001).
92. Id. at 943.
93. See id. at 943-44.
94. See id. at 944.
95. See id. Particularly egregious in this case was the fact that the state habeas judge
expressed to the parties that he "had never read the record of the trial' and that he 'did not
intend to' as he did not 'have the time.'" Id. (citing Order for Evidentiary Hr'g at 10 n.8 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 13, 1999) (unpublished)).
The Valdez dissent explained the importance of the trial transcript, particularly in capital
cases, noting that:
Mhis court has recognized that meaningful federal habeas review requires a
trial transcript, and familiarity with the trial and sentencing proceedings is no
less indispensable to the state habeas court in reaching its resolution on the
merits. In the present case, the state habeas judge did not preside over Valdez's
criminal trial. Consequently, he lacked the advantage of a personal recollection
of the trial proceedings.
Id. at 960 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). For the dissent, this
fundamental flaw in the state proceeding rendered a de novo review mandatory. See id. at 961
(Dennis, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 944-45.
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Michael Williams,97 it disagreed with both the district court's
methodology for reviewing the claim and its decision to grant
habeas relief.9
8
The district court determined "that the deferential framework
set forth at § 2254(d) and § 2254(e)(1) 'largely d[id] not apply'
because it had held an evidentiary hearing to remedy the state's
denial of a full and fair hearing.""9 It afforded a "presumption of
correctness only to the state habeas court's specific findings of
historical fact" and reviewed the rest of the evidence by a "prepon-
derance of the evidence" standard and petitioner's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim de novo. °° On review, the Fifth Circuit
held that the lack of a full and fair hearing did not lift the bar of
deference.' 01 It noted that, instead, the lower court should have
examined the state court's dismissal of the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim under AEDPA's "objectively unreasonable" standard,
and it should have presumed the correctness of findings of fact
"implicit" therein.0 2
Interestingly, in concluding that a full and fair hearing was not
necessary for the lower court to apply deference, the Fifth Circuit in
part relied on Fourth Circuit precedent-Bell v. Jarvis°3-for its
interpretation of Terry Williams and its handling of perfunctory
opinions." 4 Bell, however, did not pertain to whether the petitioner
was denied a full and fair hearing. Instead, it involved the Fourth
Circuit's review of a petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim based on a summary state court dismissal, which simply read:
"[Tihe Motion for Appropriate Relief ... fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. It is, therefore, denied."105 The Fifth
97. See id. at 945 n.6.
98. See id. at 957.
99. Id. at 945 (citing Valdez v. Johnson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (S.D. Tex. 1999)
(alteration in original)).
100. Id. at 945-46.
101. See id. at 948.
102. Id. The opinion did not make clear exactly which findings of fact were implicit in the
state court's decision to dismiss the habeas petition. Presumably, because the Fifth Circuit
remanded the case for compliance with its instructions, it expected the district court to make
that determination. See id. at 957.
103. 236 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000).
104. See Valdez, 274 F.3d at 953-54.
105. Bell, 236 F.3d at 176 (Motz, J., dissenting); see Valdez, 274 F.3d at 954.
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Circuit seemed to rely on Bell, because Bell overturned Cardwell v.
Greene,' another ineffective assistance of counsel claim that
involved both a perfunctory opinion from the state court and the
absence of a full and fair hearing during state proceedings."0 7
Though Cardwell implied that a full and fair hearing was required,
the Bell court rejected Cardwell only "'to the extent that Cardwell
requires federal habeas courts to conduct a de novo or effectively de
novo review of a summary state court decision, or to grant habeas
relief based upon an independent determination that the state
court has violated the constitutional rights of the petitioner.'"
0 8
Additionally, the standard of review the Bell court adopted in
response to the perfunctory opinion was somewhat different from its
normal deferential review and from the review that the Fifth Circuit
embraced. The Bell court claimed: "In such cases [of perfunctory
opinions], we conduct an independent examination of the record and
the clearly established Supreme Court law" while still applying the
"objectively unreasonable" standard.0 9 Whether the independent
review ultimately affected the Fourth Circuit's judgment in this and
similar cases is debatable."0 However, the Valdez court made no
mention of such a standard, instead indicating that it treated claims
based on undeveloped factual records and perfunctory analyses in
106. 152 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998).
107. See Valdez, 274 F.3d at 953.
108. Id. at 953-54 (quoting Bell, 236 F.3d at 160).
109. Bell, 236 F.3d at 158. Exactly what the Fourth Circuit meant by an "independent"
review of the record is not altogether clear. The district court hearing Monroe's case claimed
it was using the same standard. See Monroe v. Angelone, No. 3:98CV254, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26310, at *73-76 (E.D. Va. Mar. 28, 2002). For a further discussion of independent
review with deference, see infra note 110.
110. One commentator writing on Bell and perfunctory opinions generally broke the
circuits into three categories: high deference, medium deference, and no deference at all. See
Brittany Glidden, When the State Is Silent: An Analysis of AEDPA's Adjudication
Requirement, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 177, 184-85 (2001-2002). Glidden places the
Fourth Circuit in the high deference category and implies that any independent review that
such a circuit claims to perform is meaningless, because the court simply "craft[s] a story that
makes the state result justifiable." Id. at 189.
The Bell dissent would likely agree with Glidden. It accused the majority of omitting the
independent review of the state court's dismissal of petitioner's claim and proceeding straight
to an analysis of the legal claim: "[T]he majority simply cites Strickland and concludes that
the state courts' denial ... was 'neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law.' Bell, 236 F.3d at 182 (Motz, J., dissenting).
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the same manner as those based on fully developed factual records
and complete analyses at the state court level."'
The Valdez majority also defended its view on deference following
an evidentiary hearing by comparing the language of § 2254(d)(1)
before and after the passage ofAEDPA. 112 The court noted that prior
to 1996, § 2254(d) mentioned that a state court's findings were
"presumed to be correct" unless the petitioner had not been afforded
a "full and fair hearing.""' The court reasoned that since Congress
omitted reference to full and fair hearings in AEDPA, Congress
clearly intended that full and fair hearings were no longer a
prerequisite to the operation of deference. 1 4 In contrast, the dissent
argued that although the new statute failed to mention full and fair
hearings, it also omitted other crucial language that no reasonable
court could interpret as no longer required by Congress." 5 For
example, the new version failed to mandate that "the applicant for
the writ and the State or an officer or agent have been parties,"
"that the determination be evidenced by written indicia," and "that
the state court that made the determination ... be a court of
competent jurisdiction.""6 In other words, Congress could not have
intended every provision it omitted from the text of the 1996 Act to
be excluded, because it would leave the whole federal habeas review
process in shambles.
Finally, the Valdez court dismissed the petitioner's most compel-
ling argument against deferring to the state court's findings
pursuant to a federal evidentiary hearing: namely, that if the
federal court granted a petitioner an evidentiary hearing and then
essentially ignored the results by referring to an incomplete state
record, it rendered that evidentiary hearing a "useless exercise."" 7
The majority simply responded: "[Tihe hearing may assist the
111. See Valdez, 274 F.3d at 950.
112. See id. at 948-50.
113. Id. at 948-49 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994) (repealed 1996)).
114. See id. at 949-50.
115. See id. at 966 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (quoting 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4265.2 (Supp. 2001)).
117. Id. at 951-52.
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district court in ascertaining whether the state court reached an
unreasonable determination under either § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2).
"118
Thus, a de novo review based upon an evidentiary hearing is next
to impossible to obtain in the Fifth Circuit."9 Whether the Supreme
Court actually intended such an outcome when it decided Terry
Williams and Michael Williams is not altogether clear. 2 °
B. The Tenth Circuit's Requirement of a Full and Fair Hearing for
the Operation of Deference
The case of Bryan v. Mullin.21 also involved an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, where the petitioner received a death
sentence and alleged his trial counsel failed to present mitigating
evidence of his organic brain disease.'22 In reviewing the petitioner's
claim, the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals "implicitly" rejected
his request for an evidentiary hearing "when it proceeded to the
merits of Bryan's ineffective assistance claims without an eviden-
tiary hearing and denied him relief."2 ' The federal district court
granted the petitioner an evidentiary hearing, the propriety of
which the Tenth Circuit confirmed, as the petitioner had "diligently
118. Id. at 952. The court said nothing further to address exactly how the results of that
hearing would be helpful without the benefit of a de novo review of the claim.
119. The Valdez majority seemed to leave open the possibility of a de novo review
specifically if the federal court "lacked the necessary evidence with which to reach a
disposition of Valdez's claims." Id. at 957. The majority examined each piece of evidence the
federal court had before it and each piece of evidence the state habeas court had lost. See id.
at 956-57. It found that the federal district court had "sufficient descriptions of the remaining
missing exhibits to inform the district court of their probative value." Id. at 957. Presumably,
the court found the evidence immaterial to the outcome of petitioner's claim.
What is most troubling about this analysis is the fact that the trial transcript was missing
from all habeas proceedings. If the trial transcript was not crucial to the outcome of the case,
it seems unlikely that the Fifth Circuit would find any evidence sufficiently material to
warrant a de novo review. See supra note 95 (discussing the importance of the trial
transcript).
120. The Valdez dissent pointed out that Justice Kennedy's "use of the phrase full and fair'
evinces its concern for the quality of the state court process," indicating that deference to a
flawed record was not the desired result. Id. at 970 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
121. 335 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003).
122. See id. at 1212-13. Petitioner claimed this omission occurred during both the
adjudicatory and sentencing phases of his trial. See id. at 1212.
123. Id. at 1214.
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sought to develop the factual basis underlying his claims."" 4 The
Bryan court went on to apply pre-AEDPA standards according to its
own precedent, Miller v. Champion,'25 because § 2254(e)(2) applied.
The court stated:
[Ilneffective assistance claim[s] present] a mixed question of
law and fact. Because our analysis ... primarily involves consid-
eration of legal principles, we review this claim de novo.
Further, we note that because the state court did not hold any
evidentiary hearing, we are in the same position to evaluate the
factual record as it was. Accordingly, to the extent the state
court's dismissal of [petitioner's ineffective assistance claim] was
based on its own factual findings, we need not afford those
findings any deference. 126
Though Terry Williams prohibits de novo review of mixed
questions of law and fact, the Tenth Circuit's limited application of
de novo review to situations in which petitioners have met the
burden for federal evidentiary hearings may be acceptable under the
Terry Williams case.'27 Furthermore, in Michael Williams, the
Supreme Court cited Miller for its interpretation of § 2254(e)(2),"2
without commenting on or criticizing Miller's position that federal
courts should review mixed questions of law and fact de novo when
a state court's disposition of the claim was based on an incomplete
factual record. 129 Silence on the part of the Supreme Court certainly
does not mean approval, but as the Tenth Circuit has consistently
applied its position regarding full and fair hearings from 1998 to
this most recent decision in 2003, its approach is viable for now.
In conclusion, the fact that the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have
reached such diametrically opposed positions with regard to
deference and full and fair hearings, particularly in light of Terry
Williams, is a clear indication of the persistent confusion surround-
124. Id.
125. 161 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998).
126. Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1215-16 (citing Miller, 161 F.3d at 1254). The court found, in light
of Miller, the federal panel that had first reviewed the claim had "erred" by affording
deference to the state court's disposition of petitioner's Strickland claim. Id. at 1216 n.7.
127. See id. at 1216; see also supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (discussing the
standard for evidentiary hearings).
128. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000).
129. See Miller, 161 F.3d at 1254.
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ing AEDPA. Though the Supreme Court stressed the importance
of a variety of methodologies at the federal level for applying
§ 2254(d)(1), 130 it may not have intended those methodologies to
result in such disparate types of reviews amongst the federal
circuits.
C. The Standard of Review in the Fourth Circuit for "New
Evidence"
The Valdez and Bryan courts split over whether full and fair
hearings are requisite to the operation of AEDPA deference,
particularly in the context of Strickland claims and in regard to
evidence that was available to, but not considered by, state courts.
In Monroe v. Angelone,131 the Fourth Circuit examined a Brady
claim based largely on evidence that did not surface until the
federal proceeding. 32 The Fourth Circuit determined that AEDPA
deference did not apply to such "new evidence" but only to evidence
the state court had actually considered. 33 The Brady analysis
requires a collective review of all the suppressed evidence;
34
therefore, the Fourth Circuit decided it could not "accord AEDPA
deference on an item-by-item basis" to the evidence the state court
130. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
131. 323 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2003).
132. Id. at 298.
133. See id. at 297-98. In support of its position that AEDPA deference did not apply, the
Monroe court cited its own precedent and that of several other circuits. Two of the cases
involved Brady claims that petitioners first raised during their federal hearings; therefore,
there was no antecedent state court decision "on its merits" to which the federal court could
defer. Id. at 297; see Daniels v. Lee, 316 F.3d 477, 487 (4th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Coyle, 260
F.3d 684, 706 (6th Cir. 2001). The other two cases involved some evidence that the state
courts considered as well as some evidence uncovered only during the federal proceedings. In
Rojem v. Gibson, the petitioner raised a Brady claim in state court but later found an
undisclosed report regarding a vehicle near the crime scene. 245 F.3d 1130, 1140 (10th Cir.
2001). The court reviewed that piece of evidence de novo but assessed the collective effect of
all the Brady evidence in determining whether the state "fail[ed] to disclose material
evidence." See id. In Boyette v. Lefevre, the Second Circuit reviewed a Brady claim de novo,
because the state court ruled that certain Brady items were not suppressed, without
identifying the items to which it was referring. 246 F.3d 76, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2001). The court
noted that "[blecause the Appellate Division did not specify which documents Boyette failed
to show were suppressed, we have no discernable finding of fact to which we can defer." Id.
at 88.
134. See Monroe, 323 F.3d at 298.
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had reviewed.' Because petitioner had so much "new evidence," the
"new evidence" had the effect of outweighing the evidence the state
court had considered. 13
Perhaps concerned about running afoul of Terry Williams, the
Fourth Circuit was careful to note that not all Brady claims result
in de novo reviews. When merely a "scintilla" of "new evidence"
arises during the federal proceeding and the state court has
considered the bulk of the evidence, the federal court will "continue
to defer to state court decisions that relief would not be warranted
on the basis of the Brady evidence that those courts considered. " 13 7
The Monroe court found particularly compelling the fact that the
prosecution had suppressed evidence regarding its star witness,
Zelma Smith. The state court had heard some evidence specifically
related to the prosecution's suppression of its sentence reduction
deal with Smith and Smith's history as a career informant.' 5
Perhaps because petitioner presented so much additional evidence
to discredit Smith 39 and because the court appeared to believe that
135. Id. Although the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reached the same
outcome as the Fourth Circuit, it quoted a different standard of review in doing so. See
Monroe v. Angelone, No. 3:98CV254, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26310, at *72 (E.D. Va. Mar. 28,
2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). Instead of focusing on the new Brady evidence, the
district court highlighted the perfunctory state court dismissal of Monroe's claim and applied
the standard the Fourth Circuit condones in such cases: deference with an 'independent
examination of the record and the clearly established Supreme Court law.' Id. at *74 (quoting
Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 157 (4th Cir. 1998)). The district court stated that
"petitioner's objection to the application of any standard other than a de novo standard of
review is overruled."Id. at *76. As to the Brady claim, however, the district court weighed all
the exculpatory evidence and found it material to petitioner's case, never again mentioning
deference. See id. at *105. As to petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and
sufficiency of the evidence claim, the district court deferred to the state court. See id. at * 123.
The court implied that, in its independent judgment, the evidence was insufficient to support
conviction, but "given the deferential standard of review that the Court is required to apply,
the Court must overrule this objection." Id.
136. See Monroe, 323 F.3d at 297-99.
137. Id. at 299 n.19. The court also noted that § 2254(e)(2) may deter petitioners from being
less than diligent in state court in uncovering evidence in hopes of receiving better treatment
at the federal level. See id.
138. Id. at 298.
139. Petitioner submitted to the court the detective's notes in which the detective had
written that Smith was a "professional snitch" who had helped him and the FBI on other
cases. Id. at 315. Furthermore, during closing arguments, the prosecution told the jury "the
absolute truth is that she [Smith] did not ask for any consideration for her testimony from the
Commonwealth in this case. And it's absolutely true that the Commonwealth has not
promised her anything." Id. at 307 n.36. In addition, Smith had testified that the gun she sold
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the prosecution's tactics bordered on ethical violations, 4 ° it was
willing to withhold the deference it might have accorded under
normal circumstances.
Regarding "new evidence," the Fourth Circuit's opinion is
reconcilable with the district court's standard in Valdez. Deference
"'largely d[id] not apply'"' 4' in either case, as the federal court cured
the problem of the undeveloped factual record at the federal level.
Furthermore, both courts afforded a presumption of correctness only
to specific state factual findings. 42 It appears that in both cases, the
more factual findings the state court made, the more deference the
federal court was willing to apply.
In contrast, it is more difficult to reconcile Monroe with the Fifth
Circuit's Valdez opinion. The state court in Monroe's case had some
exculpatory evidence before it, particularly evidence related to
Smith's history as an informant and to the prosecution's sentence
reduction deal. However, the Fourth Circuit, for all intents and
purposes, reviewed Monroe's claim de novo. 43 On the other hand,
the presence of some evidence before the state court was enough for
the Valdez court to defer completely to the state court's conclusions.
If the trial transcript was expendable in a capital case like Valdez,
certainly Brady evidence bolstering a claim of misconduct on the
part of the prosecution in a non-capital case, as in Monroe, also
would be nonmaterial, according to the Fifth Circuit.
to Monroe came from her former boss. Id. at 295. The prosecution presented this evidence
knowing that the detective never contacted the boss to ascertain the truth of the statement,
because the detective feared the boss would deny having sold the gun to Smith. See id. During
federal discovery, petitioner contacted the boss, and indeed he denied ever having sold a gun
to Smith. Id. at 295 n.11. Finally, petitioner discovered that Smith had lied about the
publication in which she had allegedly identified Monroe as the woman to whom she sold the
gun. See id. at 295 n.10. Instead of seeing petitioner in People, Smith saw her picture in a
newspaper while Smith was awaiting sentencing. Id. Also, the detective used the very same
newspaper picture when he officially asked Smith to identify petitioner. Id.
140. Judge King wrote: "[it is difficult to ascertain whether the suppression of the Habeas
Evidence resulted from bad faith, sharp practice, negligence, or inadvertence. While we are
necessarily troubled by the prosecution's failure to satisfy its disclosure obligations, we need
not decide whether that failure was attributable to bad faith." Id. at 316 n.61.
141. Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 945 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Valdez v. Johnson, 93
F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (S.D. Tex. 1999)).
142. See Monroe, 323 F.3d at 298-99 & n.18; Valdez, 274 F.3d at 945.
143. See Monroe, 323 F.3d at 298.
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III. ARGUMENT FOR A DE Novo REVIEW FOR ALL NEW EVIDENCE
THAT IS MATERIAL TO PETITIONER'S CLAIM
The above analysis reveals that de novo review is appropriate for
all "new evidence," regardless of when it first appears during the
proceedings, provided that the evidence is material to petitioner's
claim. Furthermore, fundamental fairness and judicial efficiency are
best served by a consistent standard of review in this area.
Fundamental fairness requires the application of de novo review
for all material "new evidence." This is evident in the fact that,
based on the methods by which the federal courts currently apply
their standards of review to state court dispositions of habeas claims
with undeveloped factual records, petitioners who allege Brady
violations are more likely to succeed than those who allege other
constitutional claims, such as Strickland claims.'" Again, the
Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have all embraced de
novo style reviews for Brady evidence uncovered during the federal
proceeding. 45 Brady evidence is particularly prone to late disclo-
sure, as suppression is a key element to the claim.' Furthermore,
the prosecution has a duty to disclose both "impeachment material
and exculpatory evidence ... includ[ing] material that is 'known only
to police investigators.'"'4 v If petitioner is persistent in her disclo-
sure requests, there is a strong possibility that she will unearth
more information later in the process. Of course, this is not to say
the standard of review is easy to satisfy, as petitioner must prove
not only that the evidence was favorable to her but also that the
prosecution suppressed the evidence and that the evidence more
than likely would have resulted in a different outcome at trial. 14 If
144. Other commonly alleged constitutional violations include "improper judicial bias ...
[and] problems with the composition of the jury pool." Flood, supra note 27, at 642.
145. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
146. Again, Brady evidence is essentially any evidence helpful to the defendant's case,
regardless of whether the prosecution intended to suppress it. See Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 85 (1963).
147. Monroe, 323 F.3d at 299 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,438 (1995)). Kyles also
imposes a duty upon the prosecution to find out what police investigators know that the
prosecutor himself does not know. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438.
148. See Monroe, 323 F.3d at 299-300 (describing the three-part Brady test as defined in
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).
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a petitioner can show either good cause to obtain discovery or
diligence to obtain an evidentiary hearing, and if she can demon-
strate that the Brady evidence is material, then she has a good
chance of receiving a de novo review of evidence in four circuits. 49
Such a review is justified in these cases, because no previous court
has weighed the effect of the evidence on petitioner's claim.
In contrast, as Valdez and Bryan illustrate, an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is less likely to involve truly "new
evidence" uncovered for the first time during a federal proceeding.
Certainly, defense counsel does not suppress evidence from his own
client; rather, petitioners, particularly in capital cases, most often
accuse trial counsel of making a tactical error in failing either to
investigate petitioner's background or to present to the jury
mitigating evidence regarding petitioner's background."'5 While the
Brady framework is inherently suspicious of the prosecution by
imposing the duty to turn over evidence, a presumption of effective-
ness in favor of counsel is inherent within the Strickland frame-
work, which makes uncovering new facts even more difficult under
the deferential § 2254(d)(1) review.' 5 ' When cases like Valdez or
Bryan arise, and evidence is lost by, or not presented at all to, a
state court, the federal court will often grant an evidentiary hearing.
Depending upon the circuit in which petitioner brings her claim, a
court may or may not treat the evidence she develops on par with
Brady evidence, as the Strickland evidence is not truly "new." Yet
such a distinction between "new evidence" and evidence the state
court has not considered is illogical. Brady evidence always exists;
it simply has not come before any court until it surfaces during
the federal proceeding. The better argument is that if the state
149. The standard this Note espouses is more than a "scintilla" of evidence. As with
Monroe's case, the more compelling evidence a petitioner can uncover during the federal
proceeding, the better the chance of success.
150. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003) (explaining that trial counsel
did not prepare a social history for defendant despite the State of Maryland's provision of
funds for such preparation); Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003) (alleging
counsel did not present mitigating evidence of petitioner's organic brain disease); Valdez v.
Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 943 (5th Cir. 2001) (complaining counsel neither investigated
petitioner's retardation and background of abuse nor presented evidence of his good conduct
in prison).
151. The Strickland court warned: "[J]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be
highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance
after conviction or adverse sentence ...." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
2005] 1911
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
factfinder has not considered the evidence, then the federal court
should classify that "new evidence" as having surfaced during the
federal proceeding.152
Judicial efficiency also requires that all "new evidence" be
evaluated de novo. Petitioner Valdez made the most compelling
argument in terms of judicial efficiency. If a federal court imple-
ments a federal proceeding to cure the problem of an undeveloped
factual record but then defers to the state court's legal conclusions
based on an undeveloped record, the federal proceeding is rendered
"impotent" and time and money are wasted.'53 Though Bryan's
bright-line framework-that de novo review is required every time
a petitioner is denied a full and fair hearing-is appealing, Monroe's
"scintilla" standard is perhaps more reconcilable with Terry
Williams' prohibition on independent reviewsM and Michael
Williams' emphasis on petitioner's "reasonable attempt" to develop
her claim in state court.'55 In conclusion, provided that the evidence
developed during the federal proceeding is material to petitioner's
claim, the federal court should review that claim de novo as a
matter of both fundamental fairness and judicial efficiency.
CONCLUSION
Supreme Court precedent regarding AEDPA is far from clear.
While a variety of approaches to deference might well be desirable
when state courts have adjudicated claims based on complete
factual records, the absence of a uniform standard of review as to
undeveloped claims results in widely different outcomes for
petitioners who, through no fault of their own, were unable to
develop fully their claims in state court.
Several circuits are comfortable with viewing evidence that
surfaces for the first time during the federal proceedings as "new"
and, thus, with reviewing the underlying claim de novo. However,
152. See, e.g., Monroe, 323 F.3d at 299.
153. Valdez, 274 F.3d at 951-52.
154. The Terry Williams Court did not address "new evidence," because the petitioner was
able to develop his claim in state court pursuant to a state evidentiary hearing. Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 370 (2000). Also, unlike the Valdez case, the same judge handled
Williams' trial, sentencing, and state habeas hearing. See id.
155. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,435 (2000).
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when evidence appears during the state court proceedings but the
state court does not consider that evidence, circuits disagree as to
whether deference should operate. Treating only evidence that
surfaces for the first time during the federal proceedings as "new"
creates unfair results. This practice tends to favor Brady-type
claims, a major element of which is suppressed evidence. Claims
that rarely implicate "new evidence," such as Strickland ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, are rarely afforded a de novo review if
the factual basis for those claims went undeveloped at the state
court level. Furthermore, federal courts waste their resources in
remedying undeveloped factual records if they must then defer to
the state court's legal conclusions. The best solution to this problem
is for federal courts to determine the materiality of the new evidence
to petitioner's claim. Upon a finding that the evidence would have
affected the outcome of petitioner's trial, the court should review the
state court's legal conclusions de novo.
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